DECLARATION OF NATO PRINCIPLES FOR THE 1980'S

I THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

82-432/6

- 1. Leaders of the free nations which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, meeting in Bonn 35 years after the conception of the Marshall Plan, reaffirm their dedication to the principles which brought about that collective enterprise and which inspired the Atlantic Alliance.
- 2. The NATO member states are linked by common values, vital interests, and a commitment to unity in diversity. They are founded on shared concepts of democracy, human rights, justice, and social progress, and the conviction that the world's future lies not with totalitarian empires but with the nations which secure the creative development of the individual in freedom, justice and dignity. The accession of democratic Spain both demonstrates and enhances the vitality of this partnership.
- 3. The Allies are committed to guarantee and, through the Alliance to defend, the fundamental liberties which give the lives of their peoples full meaning and potential, among them freedom of conscience, of worship, of thought and speech, of association and movement. Their societies are organized to ensure freedom through the subordination of governments to the rule of law and consent of the governed. They believe firmly that each nation should be able to seek its own destiny in accordance with the will of its people, in full sovereignty and without outside pressure or threat.
- 4. The Alliance ensures security by deterring aggression or intimidation through the maintenance of credible nuclear and conventional forces, which will never be employed except in response to an attack. The presence of America's forces in Europe and the nuclear guarantee provided by the United States are a visible sign of this transatlantic solidarity.
- 5. NATO has guaranteed freedom, preserved the peace and safeguarded progress within the Atlantic community for over a generation. This, the longest period of stability and prosperity in Europe in this century, is the best measure of the unprecedented success of the Alliance.

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II. EAST-WEST RELATIONS

- l. Predicated on the indivisibility of Atlantic security, the Alliance was created and exists today to defend the Atlantic democracies from the threat posed by Soviet power and expansionism. This threat continues to grow as a result of Soviet policies aimed at the attainment of military superiority and Soviet willingness to use or threaten the use of its military strength in Europe and elsewhere.
- 2. The increase in Soviet conventional and nuclear armaments, aimed at achieving military superiority, continues unabated. The Soviet Union bears continuing responsibility for the repression of the Polish people and persists in waging war against the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan. Soviet intimidation of its neighbors, interference in the affairs of other nations, and exploitation of regional tensions and domestic unrest threaten international peace and security.
- 3. A stable, progressive world order depends on reciprocal adherence to the principles of restraint and responsibility which have long guided the conduct of the Alliance and its members. The lack of such restraint and responsibility on the part of the Soviet Union undermines security and cooperation in Europe and the world. It also threatens the possibility for progress on the full agenda of East-West issues and damages the prospects for the constructive East-West relationship which the Allies seek.
- 4. Soviet threats and efforts to divide the Allies have only strengthened their resolve to take those steps necessary to maintain deterrence, redress the military balance, and ensure their security in and beyond the Treaty area. Only through effective deterrence and resolute defense can the Allies bring the Soviet Union to accept that there is no alternative to a relationship based on reatraint and responsibility. Until Soviet adherence to these principles permits progress toward the constructive and secure relationship sought by the Allies, their political and economic relations with the Soviet Union cannot but be affected. They will strengthen efforts to ensure that sensitive technologies are not transferred to the Soviet Union and will not allow themselves to become dependent on exports to or imports from the Soviet Union.

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- 5. (Section on conventional defense to be completed.)
- 6. The Allies acknowledge the difficulties, particularly the social costs which impact most heavily on the needy, caused by the world-wide economic situation. They are taking concerted action to overcome these conditions. At the same time, they affirm that effective efforts to safeguard international peace and security are essential to social peace and progress in and beyond the Atlantic Community.
- 7. While improving deterrence, the Allies also rededicate themselves to strengthening peace through dialogue. They will continue to work to maintain peace and security through a stable balance of forces at the lowest possible levels. The negotiation of equitable, militarily significant, binding and verifiable arms control agreements is essential to this verifiable arms control agreements is essential to this objective. Therefore, they call on the Soviet Union to demonstrate the restraint and responsibility which are necessary for achieving progress in arms control and disarmament.
- 8. (Section on arms control, including CSCE, to be completed.)

III. NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

- 1. In an increasingly interdependent world, political, economic and military developments outside Europe, particularly in Southwest Asia, can have important consequences for the vital interests of the Allies. They call on the Soviet Union to respect the sovereignty and independence of the nations of the developing world. Stability, progress, and genuine non-alignment depend on freedom to develop economically and socially without outside interference. The partners in the Alliance will continue to contribute to the solution of the Alliance will continue to contribute to the solutions. They challenge the Warsaw Pact nations to do more than provide arms to these countries.
 - 2. The Allies seek deeper and more constructive political and economic relations with the developing countries. They will therefore continue to consult among themselves and work together with others to encourage stability and progress and reduce the risks of crisis in the developing world. A number of Allied countries possess or are determined to acquire the capability to deter aggression and to respond to requests by nations for help in resisting threats to their security or independence.

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NATO SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS GAMEPLAN

An extensive program of consultations with the Allies is a must if we are to achieve our overall objectives at the NATO Summit as well as to help preserve and protect the necessary linkages to the Versailles Economic Summit. We should avail ourselves of the several opportunities presented by various meetings and visits in the coming two to three months (see attached calendar) to build the necessary consensus for an acceptable Summit outcome. As our own thinking crystallizes, we will need to adjust the content of our discussions accordingly, moving from generalized thematic expositions to specific decisions we want the Alliance to take in June. We must also be prepared to address problem areas which might develop, e.g., hitches in the Spanish accession process. These consultations must be geared to solidifying Alliance views prior to the Spring DPC and NAC Ministerials.

NAC. The primary locus for these consultations will be the regular weekly NAC meetings at the Permrep level. To help ensure these NAC exchanges make a positive contribution they should be preceded as appropriate by instructions for demarches in capitals.

Consultations with Key Allies. In addition, we will want to seek early agreement with key Allies on critical issues as a means of generating momentum.

High level Visits. We must also take advantage of high level visits such as those of Italian President Pertini (March 25) and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands (April 19-24) to raise Summit-related issues. For example, the latter visit might prove crucial to our efforts to expedite Dutch ratification of the Spanish protocol.

High level Meetings. There will likely be at least two SCG meetings prior to the Spring NAC Ministerial the margins of which can be usefully exploited as venues for bilateral or collective consultations with senior Allied officials. Arms control aspects of the Summit would be the primary but not necessarily the only focus of such discussions. The two "Sherpa" meetings currently scheduled for April 22-23 and May 13-14 will afford opportunities to review with key Allies how to ensure the Versailles and NATO Summits complement and not overshadow one another.

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CALENDAR OF MEETINGS AND VISITS

March 23-24

March 24

March 25

April 6

April 19-24

April 22-23

May 6-7

Mid-May

May 13-14

Hay 17-18

NPG Ministerial, Colorado Springs

NAC Discussion of Draft Declaration

Visit of Italian President Pertini

SCG Meeting, Brussels

Visit of Queen Beatrix (Netherlands)

"Sherpa" Meeting Provence, France

DPC Ministerial, Brussels

SCG Meeting, Brussels

"Sherpa" Meeting, Versailles (with Political Directors)

NAC Ministerial, Luxembourg

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